Genomic Sovereigntism: Power, Authority and the Human Genome

My illustration entitled: “The Auction of Inheritance” – At a formal auction, bidders lift paddles toward an illuminated glass case containing a helix. Behind it hangs an old family photograph. One of the people in the photograph stands at the edge of the room, studying the bidders.


The completion of the Human Genome Project in 2003 gave researchers a reference sequence of extraordinary value. It also brought into sharper focus a question no sequence could answer. As genetic knowledge becomes a means of intervention, someone must decide which changes to attempt, whose body will bear them, and what reasons can justify that decision. The question I want to ask is this: Who has legitimate authority to alter the biological constitution of another human being? [1]

A scientist may know how to make a genetic change. A physician may know why it could help. Parents may be willing to pay for it, and a government may permit it. Each of these facts tells us something about how the intervention could come about. The justification must still be made to the person whose life it will affect, or, where that person cannot decide, on grounds that take their interests seriously.

Power to alter a genome is not equivalent to authority over the person whose genome is altered.

I propose the name Genomic Sovereigntism for a line of inquiry within Transhumanism that begins with this distinction. By power I mean what someone can bring about. By authority I mean the moral standing to make a particular decision. The person has a claim on the decision because it is their body and their life that will bear its consequences. That claim holds whether the intervention promises to relieve disease, expand an ability, or satisfy a preference that belongs to somebody else.

A person may give a laboratory permission to read a sample while giving it no authority to act on what it finds. Genetic privacy concerns who may know what is in that sample and how they may use the information. The question here is who may decide that someone should come to have a different biological trait in the first place.

What a physician is entrusted to do

Early work on gene therapy supplies a reason for hope and a reason for caution. In 2000, a French team reported that an experimental treatment had restored important aspects of immune function in two children with a severe inherited immunodeficiency. A later report from the same trial documented leukaemia in four patients. The possibility of substantial benefit and the possibility of grave harm belonged to the same undertaking. Both mattered to the child on whose behalf adults had to decide. [2, 3]

Consider an adult offered an experimental genetic treatment. A physician’s expertise gives weight to her judgment about its prospects and obliges her to explain the risks and alternatives. An adult capable of making the decision can accept those risks or refuse them. With a sick child, the judgment may have to be made by others. Its strongest justification comes from the child’s need for care, the evidence of likely benefit, and the consequences of delaying or declining treatment. The seriousness of the illness can strengthen that justification. It can also make families more vulnerable to promises that the evidence cannot yet support.

This is what I mean by giving the person moral priority. The decision starts with what the intervention may do for and to the person who will live with it. The success of a laboratory technique, the hopes of a family, and the ambitions of a research institution may all be relevant. Each must be considered in light of the interests of the person receiving the intervention.

Choosing for someone who cannot answer

Much of the gene therapy under investigation concerns cells in an existing patient. A change made to an embryo and capable of passing to descendants would raise a different question. It could affect a person before they were able to express any wishes and reach people beyond the family members who first agreed to it. As of now, reliable hereditary modification in humans belongs to the realm of speculation. We can still ask what would count as a good reason to exercise such power if it became available.

Reproductive medicine has already made a related choice real. In 1990, researchers reported pregnancies after using genetic testing to identify embryo sex before transfer in cases involving a risk of serious X-linked disease. Screening can inform a choice among embryos. Modification would alter the genetic constitution of an embryo itself. Both put prospective parents and physicians in a position to act on genetic information, although the reasons for choosing an embryo and the reasons for modifying one deserve separate scrutiny. [4]

Selecting a different embryo will ordinarily mean that a different child is born. The child who is born may have good reason to be glad of their life, even if the adults who made the decision acted on a troubling view of whose lives are worth having. Whether a particular child was made worse off and whether the adults had good grounds for acting are separate moral questions.

Suppose a future intervention could reliably prevent an inherited illness that causes severe pain and early death. There would be a serious moral reason to consider it. People routinely make consequential decisions for children who cannot yet choose, and sometimes delay would deprive a child of the very benefit that justifies acting. Any defensible decision would still have to reckon with uncertainty, alternatives, and the scope of the consequences. The inability to ask a future child makes the quality of the justification more important. It gives adults no special knowledge of the life that child will eventually want to lead.

The obligations run in several directions. A prospective child’s interests deserve consideration. The person undergoing fertility treatment or carrying the pregnancy retains authority over what is done to their own body. Physicians have duties that survive the payment of a fee. If a change could be inherited, agreement among the adults in the clinic would settle only part of the moral question.

The child as a person and as a project

Parents inevitably shape the lives of their children. They choose where a family will live, which language a child hears first, and what education they can provide. Some of these choices have lifelong effects. The mere fact that an influence is lasting therefore tells us too little. What matters is also the end for which an adult acts and how much room the child will have to pursue ends of their own.

Imagine that parents could give a prospective child a trait they believe will confer an advantage in a profession they value. Their desire might arise from affection or from a sincere fear that the child will otherwise fall behind. Suppose the child later chooses an entirely different life. Would the parents regard that decision as an ordinary exercise of independence, or as a waste of what they commissioned? The answer reveals something about the original choice. The danger of designing a person lies partly in the expectation that the person will one day justify the design.

Cloning exposes that expectation with particular clarity. In 1997, Ian Wilmut and his colleagues reported the birth of a sheep derived from an adult cell. The experiment showed something about what a cell could do under unusual conditions. The prospect of human reproductive cloning invites us to ask what a family might expect of a child conceived to resemble somebody else. A child brought into the world in the hope of recovering a lost son or daughter would have a life of their own. The closer the resemblance, the harder it might be for grieving adults to give that child the ordinary freedom to disappoint them. [5]


My illustration “The Auction of Inheritance” work-in-progress. The art represents that putting one person’s DNA up for sale gives the highest bidder access to something an entire family shares.


Genetic influence and human equality

The argument assumes that genes matter. Their influence can be decisive in some diseases, and understanding it can make relief possible. Human development also depends on how genes interact with one another and with the circumstances in which someone grows up. A person’s abilities, commitments, and relationships unfold over a lifetime. Genetic determinism turns one part of that account into an explanation of the whole person. It makes the designer’s confidence in a desired result especially suspect. Even if a trait could be predicted with certainty, the person who bears it would still be free to decide what place it should have in their life.

A second error is to infer human rank from genetic difference. The 1997 UNESCO declaration on the human genome and human rights affirms equal dignity regardless of genetic characteristics and calls for respect for human uniqueness and diversity. The principle matters whenever a society talks about improving its population. By what measure would it count an improvement, who would choose that measure, and what standing would people have if they fell outside it? [6]

Eugenics places the composition of a population at the centre of reproductive judgment. Genomic Sovereigntism begins with the standing of the people whose bodies and lives are at issue. There is a moral difference between trying to spare a child the suffering of a particular illness and treating people who live with that illness as less worthy of resources, respect, or a place in society. Equally, a choice can be offered in private and still be shaped by public pressure. If an insurer were to penalise families for declining a genetic intervention, its financial leverage would influence what is presented as a free choice. Reproductive freedom depends in part on whether a family can refuse without being punished for doing so.

The question for Transhumanism

Transhumanism asks what human beings might become if they could overcome some of the limits they inherit. Genetic technology gives that question a special difficulty. In much of the transhumanist promise, the person seeking a change and the person undergoing it are the same. An adult may wish to alter an aspect of their body for reasons bound up with their own sense of a good life. Hereditary intervention separates these positions. Those alive now can put their intentions into effect, while the people who will live with the consequences have yet to form intentions of their own.

This is why the familiar distinction between therapy and enhancement, though helpful, cannot carry the whole argument. A treatment can be imposed. An enhancement might be freely sought. Preventing severe disease may give us strong reasons to act for a child, while the promise of a competitive advantage may tell us more about the pressures on a parent than about the interests of the person who will inherit it. In every case, the description of the intervention leaves a further question about the authority to decide.

For now, I would begin with a practical demand. Whoever proposes to alter another person’s genetic constitution should be able to say whose interests the intervention serves, why those interests justify acting, and who will answer for its consequences. A competent person can ask those questions directly. For a child or a person yet to be born, those who make the decision must be willing to have their reasons examined by people who have no stake in its going ahead.

The value of genetic progress will be measured in part by what it enables people to do with their own lives. That includes lives begun under conditions others have chosen. What those others owe the person who comes after them is the possibility of taking up that life as their own.

Core Proposition

Power to alter a genome is not equivalent to authority over the person whose genome is altered. A genetic intervention requires the informed consent of the person affected or, where they cannot decide, a justification grounded in their interests. The person retains equal dignity and the freedom to pursue a life of their own.

References

  1. National Human Genome Research Institute. “International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project.” 14 April 2003. Announcement
  2. Cavazzana-Calvo, M., et al. “Gene therapy of human severe combined immunodeficiency (SCID)-X1 disease.” Science 288 (2000), 669–672. DOI
  3. Hacein-Bey-Abina, S., et al. “Insertional oncogenesis in 4 patients after retrovirus-mediated gene therapy of SCID-X1.” Journal of Clinical Investigation 118 (2008), 3132–3142. DOI
  4. Handyside, A. H., E. H. Kontogianni, K. Hardy, and R. M. Winston. “Pregnancies from biopsied human preimplantation embryos sexed by Y-specific DNA amplification.” Nature 344 (1990), 768–770. DOI
  5. Wilmut, I., A. E. Schnieke, J. McWhir, A. J. Kind, and K. H. S. Campbell. “Viable offspring derived from fetal and adult mammalian cells.” Nature 385 (1997), 810–813. DOI
  6. UNESCO. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights. Adopted 11 November 1997. Article 2. Declaration