
My illustration entitled: “Who Chooses the Cure?” – A child sits beside a parent in a doctor’s office. The adults are studying a treatment diagram when the child raises a finger to ask a question. The doctor turns to listen.
Genomic Other-Authorship arises when one person authorizes or directs a genetic intervention whose consequences are borne by another. This essay distinguishes that relationship from Genomic Self-Authorship and asks what can justify acting for someone who cannot consent. Preventing serious disease can give parents and clinicians grounds to act on a child’s behalf. Enhancement for a preferred talent or way of life makes a different claim on their authority. I examine that distinction across childhood treatment, reproductive selection, disability and heritable modification. The argument develops four ideas for assessing the legitimacy of other-directed intervention: the gap between power and authority, the custodial character of proxy decisions, the constitutive burdens an intervention may impose, and the limits of one generation’s authority over another.
Who will live with the decision?
Imagine two requests made to the same physician. In the first, an adult asks whether a genetic intervention might slow the progression of her illness. In the second, parents ask whether an intervention could give their future child an advantage in a pursuit they already have in mind. In both cases the physician must ask what the intervention can achieve and what harm it might cause. The second request also raises a question about the parents’ standing. What entitles them to choose an enduring characteristic that someone else will have to live with?
In writing about Genomic Self-Authorship, I argued that a competent person ordinarily has the strongest claim to authorize an intervention affecting their own biology. That claim rests on the person’s authority to decide what risks and changes to accept in the course of their own life. A parent deciding for a child must give an account of why the decision serves the child. A physician and a government face the same demand when they propose to act on another person’s behalf. The ability to change a genome leaves that demand unanswered.
Formal definitions
Genomic Self-Authorship is the capacity of a person to make informed and voluntary decisions about interventions to their own biological constitution, including whether to pursue, decline or defer a change.
Genomic Other-Authorship is genetic intervention in which the person authorizing or directing the modification is not the person whose biological constitution bears its consequences.
These definitions concern the location of decision-making authority. A physician can perform an intervention the patient has chosen without taking authorship away from the patient. A parent who authorizes an intervention for a child who cannot consent occupies a different position, even when the parent acts with care and the physician agrees. The parent must have reasons to act for the child. The question is what those reasons can authorize and where their force runs out.
Custodial authority and childhood treatment
Consider a young child with a serious inherited condition. Suppose a genetic treatment has credible evidence of benefit, and waiting until the child can consent would risk permanent harm. A parent may have sufficient grounds to authorize treatment. The justification comes from the child’s interest in avoiding that harm, the evidence supporting the intervention and the cost of delay. A child’s inability to decide makes proxy judgment necessary in such a case. It also makes the adults responsible for keeping the child’s interests at the centre of that judgment. Article 5 of UNESCO’s 1997 declaration likewise places the interests of the affected person at the centre of authorization when that person cannot consent. UNESCO, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, Article 5.
This is what I mean by custodial authority. Adults may have a duty to decide while someone else depends on their care. The scope of that authority follows from the duty. A child who can understand what is proposed should be heard, and the weight given to their wishes should grow with their capacity to decide. A person may also need support to take part in a decision that others would otherwise make for them. Custodians exercise their authority well when the person affected can assume more of it as their capacity develops.
The urgency of an illness can justify acting before consent becomes possible. An elective enhancement that can safely wait has a weaker claim on the same authority. Suppose parents believe their child would benefit from an intervention intended to increase physical endurance. If the opportunity will still be available in adulthood, waiting gives the child a decision they can make for themselves. If the opportunity will disappear, the loss deserves consideration. The parents must still show why securing that particular advantage warrants making an enduring choice on the child’s behalf.
Embryos, selection and parental aspiration
Embryo modification and reproductive selection are different acts. Modifying an embryo changes genetic material in that embryo. Selecting among embryos for transfer can affect which child may come to exist. It does not alter the selected embryo’s genes and therefore falls outside Genomic Other-Authorship in the strict sense defined here. The practices still raise a related moral question. When prospective parents or clinics use genetic criteria in reproductive decisions, what place should the interests of a future child have alongside the adults’ aims?
That question can be asked without settling every dispute about the moral status of embryos. If a modification is intended to lead to the birth of a child, we can ask in advance whether exposing that child to its risks is justified. Selection presents a different difficulty. Where a different choice would have resulted in a different child, it may be impossible to say that the child who exists would personally have been better off had another embryo been selected. There remains room to judge the practice by the reasons it encourages, the pressures it places on families and the expectations adults impose on children who are born.
Parents routinely hope their children will share an interest, continue a family practice or excel in some pursuit. A child may welcome those hopes and make them their own. A genetic intervention introduces a stronger form of commitment on the child’s behalf, especially when its effects endure after the child rejects the aim that prompted it. A child born with an advantage chosen for sport owes no athletic career in return. A clinic that sells the prospect of a particular kind of child should answer for the expectations it cultivates, even if the outcome it advertises is uncertain.

My illustration “Who Chooses the Cure?” work-in-progress. The art represents that even when adults must choose a child’s treatment, the child deserves a voice in decisions about her own body.
Disability and the grounds for intervention
A disability-related intervention can be justified by the relief it offers a particular person. If an intervention can prevent severe pain or preserve a function the child is likely to value across many ways of life, there is a reason to consider it. Other cases demand more attention to how the condition is experienced and what social support is available. A hearing difference, for example, can have implications for communication, family relationships and membership in a linguistic community. A serious assessment should hear from people who live with the condition, alongside clinicians who understand what the intervention can do.
Disability-rights critics of prenatal testing have warned that an assessment of a trait can come to stand in for an assessment of the person who has it. Their warning matters to treatment as well as selection. Parents may have a sound reason to prevent suffering while also affirming the equal standing of people who live with the condition. A programme that offers modification should be judged in part by how it treats families who decline and by the support available to people whose lives do not follow its preferred outcome. Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing, 1999.
Constitutive burden and the child’s future
I use constitutive burden to describe what a person may have to carry because another chose an enduring change to their biological constitution. The burden can include side effects, dependence on long-term monitoring or an alteration that forecloses an ability the person later values. It can also arise from the terms on which adults expect the person to live with the change. A child may benefit from a particular ability and still have to contend with family or institutional claims about what that ability obliges them to become. These consequences belong in the decision before the intervention is authorized.
Future autonomy concerns the child’s ability to form and pursue aims of their own. An open future cannot mean preserving every conceivable option. Childhood care involves choices that close some possibilities while protecting others. A timely intervention may enlarge a child’s future when delay would lead to avoidable illness or loss of function. An optional intervention can narrow it when the change is lasting, the expected benefit depends heavily on a life the adults favour, and the child could have made the decision later.
One question helps distinguish those cases. Would the intervention still be worth doing for the child if they grow up to reject the parents’ hopes for how it will be used? Relief from severe pain usually retains its value across many different lives. An intervention intended to give a child an advantage in a particular competitive career may be harder to defend on those terms. That test leaves room for genuine benefits from enhancement. It also gives parents a reason to examine which benefits belong to the child and which depend on fulfilling somebody else’s plan.
Germline modification and intergenerational authority
A genetic change confined to a child’s body raises questions about what can be justified for that child. A germline modification that can be passed on extends the inquiry to descendants who may inherit it. In April, David Baltimore and colleagues called for clinical attempts at human germline genome modification to be discouraged while the wider implications were examined. Their intervention in the debate recognises the need for public deliberation alongside scientific assessment. Even if future evidence answers a question about technical safety, families and institutions will still have to answer the question of authority. David Baltimore and colleagues, A Prudent Path Forward for Genomic Engineering and Germline Gene Modification, 2015.
Intergenerational authority concerns the grounds on which people living now may make decisions whose biological effects can reach later generations. Every generation leaves conditions its successors did not choose. The possibility of transmitting a deliberate genetic change makes it particularly important to ask why the benefit could not be achieved by less far-reaching means, how uncertainty would be handled, and who would be responsible for responding to harms. The parents’ permission can authorize their own participation in a procedure. It cannot do the entire moral work of justifying the risks borne by descendants.
Public oversight should bring those wider effects into view. It can require independent scrutiny of the evidence and include people whose experience is otherwise easily overlooked, including families affected by inherited disease and people living with disabilities. A state can have grounds to prevent serious harm without acquiring a mandate to decide which traits a population ought to possess. The same limit applies when a government invokes lower healthcare expenditure or greater national competitiveness as a reason to influence reproductive decisions.
The Genomic Authority Gap
The Genomic Authority Gap begins wherever the means to alter another person’s biology are available but the grounds for directing that change have yet to be established. A clinic may have the equipment, prospective parents may be able to pay, and the intervention may be technically feasible. Each fact explains how the intervention could occur. To justify it, the decision-makers still have to account for the affected person’s interests, the burdens they would assume and the choices they would retain.
In a case of serious childhood disease, a duty of care, sound evidence and the consequences of waiting may together justify acting. For an elective enhancement shaped by parental aspiration, those same considerations may favour leaving the decision to the child. Where a change can be inherited, the justification must reach beyond the immediate family. The power to begin another person’s life under conditions we have chosen gives us a responsibility to leave them room to decide what to make of it.