
My illustration entitled: “The Copyist and the Portrait” – A copyist reproduces a meticulous drawing of a double helix. Beside the drawing hangs an unfinished portrait of the person it came from. A painter lowers the brush and looks to the sitter before making another mark.
Debates about genomic sovereignty often concern the governance of genetic samples, genomic data, and the scientific and economic benefits derived from them. Genomic Sovereigntism asks who may authorize an intervention that alters a human person’s genetic constitution. This essay distinguishes those questions through scholarship on postcolonial science policy and Indigenous genomic data governance, then applies the distinction to sample custody, sequence possession, patents, state jurisdiction, and parental authority. Genomic information can make interventions possible, and control of that information can determine who gets access to them. The legitimacy of altering a person’s genetic constitution nevertheless requires a justification grounded in the proposed intervention and the people who will bear its effects.
What is being governed?
Imagine a public biobank that holds a blood sample, a laboratory that has permission to analyse it, and a company that holds a patent covering a potentially useful gene-editing method. A clinician learns from the analysis that the donor might benefit from a future treatment. Each institution has something relevant to the proposed intervention. The biobank holds material, the laboratory has access to information, and the company controls certain uses of an invention. The donor must still decide whether to become a patient. None of the permissions already in place answers that question for them.
Much confusion arises because the word genome can refer in practice to several different things. A vial contains biological material. A file records a sequence. A population study estimates patterns across many people. A person’s genetic constitution is part of the living body through which they experience the consequences of an intervention. These things are connected, but the grounds for controlling one do not automatically carry over to the others. A claim over a record or a resource needs to be assessed in relation to what its holder proposes to do with it.
Control over genomic information and authority over genomic intervention are distinct normative problems.
Genomic Sovereigntism concerns legitimate authority to perform interventions that alter a human person’s genetic constitution. Its central question is who may authorize a proposed change, on what grounds, and within what limits.
What genomic sovereignty has meant in the literature
Ruha Benjamin’s 2009 study, “A Lab of Their Own,” examines genomic sovereignty as a way postcolonial countries framed investment in genomics. Her account situates national projects in relation to international efforts to map genetic variation, the emerging field of public health genomics, and pharmaceutical interest in markets organised around population categories. The political question was who would acquire the scientific capacity to study genetic variation, decide how findings might be used, and share in their benefits. Benjamin also identifies a tension. Efforts to build national scientific and commercial autonomy could depend on international networks and foreign capital, while mapping national diversity could give genetic significance to contested social categories. [1]
Ernesto Schwartz-Marín and Alberto Arellano Méndez examine how Mexico’s genomic-sovereignty agenda entered its health law as an effort to protect what was described as Mexican genetic patrimony. They question the scientific basis for treating a population’s genetic patterns as uniquely and cleanly bounded. They also argue that a law framed as safeguarding a national public good could be used to concentrate control over research and make access to samples and data a point of dispute among scientific elites. In a comparative study of Mexico and Colombia, Schwartz-Marín and Eduardo Restrepo identify a related problem. Attempts to prevent appropriation can reinforce the idea that a nation or an ethnoracial group possesses a fixed genetic identity. A policy can contest one form of extraction while reproducing the categories through which that extraction was justified. [2, 3]
Indigenous claims over genomic data deserve to be understood on their own terms. Maui Hudson and colleagues, writing this year, examine how expectations of unrestricted data sharing can conflict with Indigenous peoples’ rights and interests. They argue for greater community participation and governance that takes trust, accountability, and equity seriously. The issue includes who sets research terms, who can approve access and reuse, and whether communities share in the benefits. A community’s interest in how research describes it can persist even if the names of individual participants are withheld. A national government and an Indigenous community may therefore have different claims to govern the same research, and national control alone need not protect the community’s interests. [4]
These works describe different projects. Some ask how a country can develop scientific capacity and govern the circulation of resources. Others ask how peoples and communities can exercise meaningful control over research conducted with them or about them. The shared point for this essay is that their questions often arise before anybody proposes a clinical intervention. They concern how material and knowledge are collected, classified, circulated, and used, and who is accountable for the benefits and harms of those uses.
Genomic Sovereignty vs Genomic Sovereigntism
| Dimension | Genomic Sovereignty | Genomic Sovereigntism |
|---|---|---|
| Primary concern | Governance of genomic data, biological samples, research resources, and benefits. | Legitimate authority to alter a human person’s genetic constitution. |
| Central question | Who may collect, store, access, transfer, interpret, or reuse genomic material and information? | Who may authorize a particular genetic intervention, and whose interests and consent matter? |
| Typical claimants | Individuals, communities, Indigenous peoples, states, and research institutions, depending on the context. | The affected person, anyone acting under a duty to that person, and others whose bodies or inherited biology could be affected. |
| Typical dispute | Whether a repository may share population-level sequence data for a new study. | Whether anyone may authorize a lasting genetic change for a person who cannot consent. |
| What a valid decision settles | Which uses of a resource are permitted and on what terms. | Whether a specified intervention is authorized for the person who will bear its effects. |
A sequence, a sample, and a person
Genomic-data sovereignty concerns decision-making over information. In a public repository this may include who sets the terms of access and reuse, what obligations follow the data across institutions or borders, and who may contest a proposed use. Privacy addresses exposure and use of information about people. The two overlap, but a dataset can be handled confidentially while the people from whom it was derived have little say in its research uses. Conversely, a decision to share data under accountable terms can be consistent with some forms of data sovereignty. The questions concern who decides and what the participants and communities have reason to protect.
Sample custody raises a related question about physical material. A repository may be authorised to retain a donated sample while its consent terms limit further uses. Even where a laboratory has an ownership claim over material in its possession, the scope of that claim must be established separately from its authority to act on the donor. UNESCO’s 2003 International Declaration on Human Genetic Data treats the collection, use, and storage of data and samples as matters requiring consent, subject to specified limitations. It addresses use for a purpose incompatible with the original consent separately. The significance of those provisions is that a permission attaches to a purpose. Possession by itself tells us little about which purposes have been authorised. [5]
Suppose the donor permits researchers to sequence a sample and use the resulting data to study an inherited disorder. A later finding suggests a possible intervention. That finding may justify offering information or inviting the person to consider a clinical proposal, subject to the terms under which the research was conducted. Carrying out the intervention requires authority of its own. The point applies even if some work would take place outside the body. Permission to study donated cells and authorization to administer modified cells to a patient concern different acts and consequences.
Permissions can also come apart in the other direction. A patient’s consent to treatment does not settle whether a disputed research dataset may be used to develop it. A community governance body might have a defensible claim over access to a repository without acquiring standing to decide whether any community member accepts an intervention. A single project can require both forms of authorization, and the people entitled to give them may differ.

My illustration “The Copyist and the Portrait” work-in-progress. The art represents that even when others can copy your DNA, the decision to alter it remains yours.
What patents and public jurisdiction authorize
Under United States patent law, the grant includes a right to exclude others from specified uses of the claimed invention. The object of the right is the invention. Consider a company that licenses a patented method to a clinic. The licence can resolve a dispute about the clinic’s use of the method in relation to the patent. It cannot resolve whether the clinic may use it on a particular patient. That question still depends on the patient’s consent or another defensible basis for authorization, the clinician’s responsibilities, and the conditions under which the intervention may be offered. [6]
Control of a patented tool can nevertheless influence which choices a patient can actually make. A company may shape access through price or licensing terms. That influence matters because a person may have little practical choice among providers even while retaining the right to refuse. The Genomic Power–Authority Distinction helps locate the problem. The company’s bargaining position may explain why an intervention happens under certain terms. Its standing to determine what is done to the patient would require a different justification.
A state also has claims of different kinds. Regulators can set standards for clinical research and restrict interventions that present unacceptable risks. A government can fund local research or regulate transfers of samples and data. These activities concern the conditions under which institutions may act. They provide no straightforward basis for claiming that a citizen’s genetic constitution belongs to the state. Suppose officials propose a voluntary treatment programme after identifying a frequent inherited disorder. The expected public benefit can justify making treatment available. Requiring citizens to undergo it would call for a separate justification addressed to the people on whom that requirement would fall.
What parents can authorize on a child’s behalf
Biological parenthood explains part of a child’s genetic inheritance. A parent’s authority to make a medical decision rests on their responsibilities to the child. That distinction matters when the child cannot decide and a genetic intervention is proposed. A parent may have a defensible basis for authorizing treatment where there is strong evidence that it would avert serious harm and delay would close off the benefit. The justification is the child’s need and the parent’s role in meeting it. An elective change sought chiefly to realise the parent’s ambitions cannot draw on the same reasons simply because the parent can sign the same form.
It is tempting to answer claims of parental or institutional ownership by saying that every person owns their own genome. As an expression of bodily self-determination, the language is understandable. Its limits become clearer in the hard cases. The morally significant question is whether a person has standing to consent to or refuse a particular intervention, including one they could never perform themselves. A model built entirely around ownership gives an incomplete account of how parents may act for a child, how a child comes to exercise their own authority, and why some consequences for descendants call for justification beyond an agreement among the adults present.
Two permissions for one project
Return to the biobank, laboratory, and patent holder. Suppose the laboratory’s access is properly authorised, the licence is secured, and an independent review finds enough evidence to justify offering the intervention. The adult still has a decision to make. They may accept the procedure, decline it, or ask for time. If the person cannot decide, the question becomes whether someone else has authority to act for them and whether the proposed intervention serves purposes that justify the exercise of that authority. UNESCO’s 1997 declaration on the human genome likewise addresses risk and benefit alongside consent and requires attention to the person’s interests when they cannot consent. [7]
The reverse case matters equally. Suppose the patient wants treatment, but developing it would require a new use of samples collected under different terms. The patient’s decision about their own body does not settle the claims of the people or communities whose samples would be used. Ethical scrutiny must follow the project through each decision. An institution should be able to say who authorised access to the resource, who authorised the intervention, and why each was entitled to make that decision. A document granting one permission cannot supply the grounds for the other.
Genomic sovereignty scholarship is essential to understanding who controls the materials and knowledge on which genetic interventions depend. Genomic Sovereigntism takes up the question that comes into focus when someone proposes to use those resources to change a person’s genetic constitution. The resources may be governed through public law, community authority, research agreements, and individual consent. The intervention must also be justified to the person who will live with the change, including when another person has to decide on their behalf.
References
- Benjamin, Ruha. “A Lab of Their Own: Genomic Sovereignty as Postcolonial Science Policy.” Policy and Society 28, no. 4 (2009), 341–355. DOI
- Schwartz-Marín, Ernesto, and Alberto Arellano Méndez. “The Law of Genomic Sovereignty and the Protection of ‘Mexican Genetic Patrimony’.” Medicine and Law 31, no. 2 (2012), 283–294. Article record
- Schwartz-Marín, Ernesto, and Eduardo Restrepo. “Biocoloniality, Governance, and the Protection of ‘Genetic Identities’ in Mexico and Colombia.” Sociology 47, no. 5 (2013), 993–1010. DOI
- Hudson, Maui, et al. “Rights, Interests and Expectations: Indigenous Perspectives on Unrestricted Access to Genomic Data.” Nature Reviews Genetics 21 (2020), 377–384. DOI
- UNESCO. International Declaration on Human Genetic Data. 2003, Articles 8, 14, 16, and 18. Declaration
- United States Code, Title 35, § 154(a)(1), “Contents and Term of Patent; Provisional Rights.” 2014 edition
- UNESCO. Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights. 1997, Article 5. Declaration