Custodians, Not Sovereigns: Parental Authority Over the Future Genome

My illustration entitled: “The Permission That Expires” – A family opens a wooden box on the child’s eighteenth birthday. Inside are a childhood treatment authorization and a sealed genetic record. The parents slide the box across the table, and the young adult breaks the seal.


Who may authorize a genetic intervention for someone who cannot decide for themselves? This article introduces the Sovereignty–Custodianship Distinction within Genomic Sovereigntism. Sovereign authority is the first-person authority of a competent individual over interventions affecting their own biological constitution. Custodial authority is the limited authority to act for another person’s welfare during a period of dependency or incapacity. Parents may have strong grounds to authorize treatment for a serious inherited disease, especially when delay would cause lasting harm. Those grounds do not extend automatically to elective enhancement, trait selection or heritable modification. Legitimate custodianship requires attention to the person’s welfare and developing agency, the necessity and proportionality of the intervention, the availability of less restrictive alternatives, and the consequences of changes that cannot readily be reversed.

Why parents have authority

Suppose parents learn that their young child has an inherited condition that will cause serious, permanent harm unless treated early. A genetic intervention is available in this hypothetical case, with credible evidence of benefit and risks proportionate to the illness. The child cannot understand the decision, and waiting for consent would cost the child a chance to avoid the harm. The parents have a reason to act because resolving the decision is part of caring for a person who depends on them.

Now suppose the same parents are offered an intervention intended to increase the child’s chances of excelling in a sport. Their knowledge of the child, affection and willingness to provide care are unchanged. The grounds for acting have changed. In the first case the child faces a harm that may become irreversible if nobody decides. In the second the adults propose an enduring change for a purpose the child may never share. A parent’s relationship to the child matters in both cases, but it cannot supply the same justification for both decisions.

This is a practical consequence of the distinction at the heart of Genomic Sovereigntism. The power to make a genetic change does not confer the authority to direct it. Biological parenthood may establish ties and responsibilities. The reasons that justify a decision about a child’s genome come from the responsibilities of care and from what the decision means for the child. An adoptive parent or guardian can have the same moral standing to authorize necessary treatment. A biological parent’s genetic connection, on its own, gives no additional claim to specify the child’s traits.

The Sovereignty–Custodianship Distinction

Sovereign authority is the first-person authority a competent individual exercises in deciding whether to accept, refuse or defer an intervention affecting their own biological constitution. Competence concerns the decision at hand and should be assessed with appropriate support. The person has presumptive authority over what happens to their body. Their consent does not require a clinician to provide an unsafe intervention or settle risks the intervention would impose on others.

Custodial authority is the limited, fiduciary-like authority a parent or guardian exercises for another person’s welfare when that person cannot make the decision. The custodian is entrusted with a judgment that has to be made on somebody else’s behalf. The person affected remains the one to whom the decision is owed. The custodian must account for the benefit sought, the burden imposed and the scope left for that person to participate now or decide later.

These forms of authority can coexist within one family or even within one clinical decision. An adult may exercise sovereign authority over a procedure involving their own body while also asking whether an intervention affecting a future child is justifiable. A parent may have authority to authorize urgent treatment for a child who cannot decide, while that child remains able to express preferences about how the treatment and follow-up are conducted. Recognising the parent’s role should make it easier to identify what still belongs to the child.

Question Sovereign authority Custodial authority
Who decides? The competent person whose body is affected. A parent or guardian acting for someone who cannot make the decision.
What justifies the decision? The person’s informed and voluntary judgment about their own life and body. A defensible judgment about the affected person’s welfare and future agency.
How much risk may be accepted? The person can weigh personal risks according to their values, subject to clinical and third-party limits. The burden must be proportionate to the benefit reasonably expected for the affected person.
What does irreversibility require? Understanding and voluntary acceptance of the enduring consequences. Stronger grounds for acting now, including why waiting or using a less restrictive alternative would be inadequate.
When does the authority end? It remains with the person while they can make the particular decision. It yields as the person becomes able to decide, with participation supported along the way.

The Custodial Authority Principle

When a person cannot make a genomic decision, a parent or guardian may authorize an intervention on that person’s behalf only on defensible grounds of the person’s welfare. The intervention must be proportionate to the benefit sought, necessary in light of reasonable alternatives and the costs of waiting, and designed to preserve as much of the person’s present and future agency as the circumstances permit. Custodial authority confers no sovereignty over that person’s biological constitution.

Welfare here includes the child’s present experience and the conditions in which they will grow. A plausible benefit has to be assessed in light of evidence, uncertainty and the burden of the intervention. Necessity is relative to the aim. If an accessible, less burdensome option can protect the child to a comparable degree, the more intrusive proposal is harder to justify. Proportionality asks whether the expected benefit is sufficient for what the child is being asked to bear. A speculative advantage offers little justification for a substantial or poorly understood risk.

Reversibility belongs on both sides of the decision. An irreversible intervention demands greater justification, yet declining or postponing it can also have irreversible consequences. Imagine that waiting a few years would allow a young person to decide but would also allow serious disease to destroy an ability the intervention could preserve. Protecting future agency may require acting early. If a temporary measure could protect the same ability through those years, it may allow the child to take part in the eventual decision. The moral question is what agency each available course actually leaves the child.

Serious inherited disease and the child’s voice

When a child is at risk of severe pain or progressive loss of function, parents can have good grounds to authorize a well-supported intervention before the child can consent. They should be able to ask how likely the benefit is, what follow-up would require and how the child might fare with other care. Article 5 of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights calls for prior assessment of risks and benefits and for authorization guided by the person’s interests when that person cannot consent. [1]

Children can have views that matter before they can carry the whole decision. A child may understand the demands of repeated hospital visits, fear a particular procedure or prefer to postpone an option whose benefits feel remote. The 2016 American Academy of Pediatrics policy statement treats parental permission and childhood assent as active processes and calls for increasing participation as children mature. The Convention on the Rights of the Child likewise connects parental guidance to evolving capacities and gives weight to the child’s views according to age and maturity. [2, 3]

A child’s persistent objection to a deferrable procedure deserves substantial weight. Where a delay threatens grave harm, adults may have to act despite a child’s objection. They still owe an explanation the child can understand and should preserve choices about the parts of care the child can influence. In ordinary cases, more than one decision may reasonably protect the child’s interests. Custodianship leaves families room for judgment within that range. Independent review becomes more important where the risks are serious, the intervention is experimental, or disagreement concerns whether the child faces substantial avoidable harm.


My illustration “The Permission That Expires” work-in-progress. The art represents that a parent’s authority to make genetic decisions is a temporary duty of care, and the broken seal marks the moment the daughter can decide for herself.


Enhancement and elective trait selection

An enhancement can offer a real benefit. The difficulty is establishing whether it is a benefit the child can use for purposes of their own, and whether it warrants an enduring decision made before they can participate. Parents who hope to give a child greater endurance might believe it will widen the child’s options. Their case weakens if the expected value depends mainly on years of competitive training that the child may never want. It weakens further if a comparable benefit could be pursued later or through an ordinary activity the child can stop.

Disability makes this assessment particularly sensitive to whose account of welfare is heard. Preventing severe pain may serve a child across many possible ways of life. Other traits can have consequences that depend heavily on access, accommodation, relationships and community. Disability-rights critiques of prenatal testing have warned that judging a trait can slide into judging the person who lives with it. A defensible welfare assessment therefore asks what difficulty an intervention would address, what support could address it as well, and how people with the condition understand what is being offered. [4]

Elective trait selection raises a related concern through a different act. Selecting an embryo for transfer can affect which child comes to exist. Editing an embryo changes the genetic constitution of that embryo. An objection to selection cannot simply assume that the same child would have existed with a different set of traits had another embryo been chosen. There are still grounds to question clinics that present speculative traits as reliable promises, or social arrangements that make families feel obliged to select for status. And a child owes no performance in return for having been selected with a particular outcome in mind.

Embryos and heritable consequences

Calling attention to the welfare of a future child does not require settling every dispute about the moral status of embryos. When an intervention on an embryo is intended to lead to a birth, the foreseeable conditions of the resulting child’s life already matter to the decision. Prospective parents have legitimate interests in forming a family. Those interests explain why a reproductive option may matter deeply to them. They leave a further question about whether the expected benefit for the child justifies the risks the child would bear. Any intervention involving a pregnant person also requires separate respect for their authority over their own body.

A potentially heritable modification extends the reach of the decision beyond the prospective child. Descendants may inherit consequences that the original decision-makers could only partly anticipate. A parent may stand in a clear relationship of responsibility to a child. No comparable relationship gives that parent unrestricted authority to accept biological risks on behalf of later generations. The possibility of transmission strengthens the case for independent scrutiny, reasonable alternatives and public accountability for decisions whose effects may outlast the family and institutions that made them.

The National Academies’ 2017 report on human genome editing considered a limited path for possible future clinical trials of heritable editing. Among the conditions it identified were a serious disease or condition, the absence of reasonable alternatives, effective oversight and plans for long-term follow-up across generations. These are conditions for considering trials in compelling circumstances. The custodial question remains even if those conditions can someday be met. Who bears the foreseeable burden, what justifies imposing it, and how will later people be able to make choices about their care and participation? [5]

Acting now and leaving room to decide

Custodial authority can justify decisive action. It can also require parents to leave a consequential option open for the person they care for. The difference turns on the circumstances of that person’s life. Where waiting risks serious harm and a proportionate intervention can prevent it, early action can preserve the capacity to choose later. Where the expected gain is elective and the decision can wait, letting the child grow into it honours the same duty of care.

The power to shape the conditions of a child’s life comes with a responsibility to ask which decisions need to be made now and which the child can inherit as decisions of their own. Parents exercise legitimate authority when they can answer that question in terms of the child’s welfare, the evidence available and the room left for the child to direct their future.

References

  1. UNESCO. (1997). Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights. Articles 2 and 5.
  2. American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics. (2016). Informed consent in decision-making in pediatric practice. Pediatrics, 138(2), e20161484.
  3. United Nations. (1989). Convention on the Rights of the Child. Articles 3, 5 and 12.
  4. Parens, E., & Asch, A. (1999). The disability rights critique of prenatal genetic testing: Reflections and recommendations. Hastings Center Report, 29(5), supplement.
  5. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2017). Human Genome Editing: Science, Ethics, and Governance. The National Academies Press. Chapter 5, Recommendation 5-1.